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There is a need for a general and 
thorough approach to justifying, 
explaining, demonstrating, working, 
sampling, using, creating real skills 
in Risk Analysis in any area of 
the human society. Such a need is 
embedded in human evolution and 
it gains importance every time one 
needs to develop forecasts of future 
courses of action. 
The current paper entitled “Part 
One - Why Risk Analysis?” represents  
the beginning of a series that is going 
to be published in the subsequent 
issues of the Journal of Defense 
Resources Management (referred 
to as Journal from here on). The 
series will contain topics to enhance 
understanding and knowledge of 
Risk and Risk Actions (Analysis, 
Assessment, Management, etc). Even 
though covering this multi-sided ﬁ  eld 
is not a pragmatic goal, the authors 
to embark on this project series will 
attempt to approach it from as many 
standpoints as possible
The Journal Risk Analysis Series 
aims at covering both general topics 
like What Is Risk Analysis, What 
Fields Does Risk Analysis Apply 
To, Risk Analysis Speciﬁ  cs  for 
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The goal of this paper is to introduce the reader to the Risk Analysis Series to 
be developed in the pages of the Journal of Defense Resources Management. Risk 
analysis is of outmost importance in dealing with resource allocation and this is the 
reason the paper’s author started this series. Different views and approaches will 
be added during further discussion about risk analysis so that the reader develops a 
habit or skills of dealing with this intricate and challenging ﬁ  eld. 
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Speciﬁ  c Fields, How Others Do Risk 
Analysis & Need for Improvement, 
Risk Analysis & Compared Risk 
Management, etc., and speciﬁ  c 
topics such as Defense Resources 
Management Risk Analysis   
accompanied by corresponding 
case studies, intended to represent 
references for those who wish to 
develop their skills in Risk Analysis.
Why Risk Analysis? Because:
- humans want to push away, as far 
as possible from their daily routine, 
the unknown and uncertainty. 
- certainty counts for less than 
1% in our lives. However, we still 
believe it is safe to go on with it.
- people like to play risky but they 
do not like to lose.
- companies face risk if they 
move forward, and they face risk if 
they stand still.
- almost everything we do in 
today’s business world involves a 
risk of some kind: customer habits 
change, new competitors appear, 
and factors outside any control 
could delay projects. Therefore, risk 
analysis and risk management can 
help assess these risks and decide 
what actions to take to minimize disruptions to plans. Moreover, 
they can also contribute to deciding 
whether the strategies to be used to 
control risk are cost-effective.
- coming down to the societal 
or organizational levels, the overall 
security of that entity is at stake 
when acting without being aware of 
possible threats or risks calculated, 
miscalculated or not yet calculated.
- it can be as simple or as 
complex as one wants it to be, 
according to several factors such as a 
person’s level of understanding (that 
is why risk analysis is performed 
only form a certain level above by 
any organizational entity), level of 
expertise, intelligence, statistical 
tools available, etc.
- historically, it is embedded in 
human evolution and actions, whether 
that was a matter of purposeful action 
or just reﬂ  ex. People have always had 
something they considered valuable 
(evaluated against a scale ranging 
from very important, normal or less 
important) and hence, they granted 
assessed their fears, concerns, frights 
or dreads not to lose the things 
they cared for against such scales 
of importance.  The more intense 
the feeling, the higher the level of 
importance they granted to that thing, 
accordingly.
Thus, in time people started to 
keep and pass on this knowledge 
because it was half experienced and 
half thought of. The half thought was 
understandable for quite a few, in 
the beginning, but the experienced 
half could very easily be transmitted 
by different means. Historically 
one can see here oral and written 
communication using a plethora of 
means for both oral and written ways, 
according to the respective level of 
societal evolution during a certain 
age.
- one wishes to identify threats.
The  ﬁ   rst stage of risk analysis 
consists in the identiﬁ  cation of threats 
looming ahead such as: human – 
posed by individuals or organizations, 
illness, death, etc.; operational 
– emerging from supplies and 
operations disruption, loss of access to 
essential assets, distribution failures, 
etc.; reputational emerging from loss 
of business partner’s or employee’s 
conﬁ  dence, or damage to reputation 
in the market; procedural resulting 
from failures in accountability, from 
internal systems and controls, from 
organization, fraud, etc.; project – 
the risks of cost over-run, jobs taking 
too long to accomplish, insufﬁ  cient 
product or service quality, etc.; 
ﬁ   nancial stemming from business 
failure, stock market, interest rates, 
unemployment, etc.; technical – 
advances in technology, technical 
failure, etc.; natural – threats from 
weather, natural disaster, accident, 
disease, etc.; political –  changes in tax 
regimes, public opinion, government 
policy, foreign inﬂ  uence, etc.
Threat analysis is important 
because it is so easy to overlook 
important threats. One way of trying 
to capture them all is to use a number 
of different approaches. Firstly, run 
through a list such as the one above, 
to see if any apply.  Secondly, think 
through the systems, organizations or 
structures you operate, and analyze 
risks to any part of those. Next, see if 
you can see any vulnerability within 
these systems or structures. Ask other 
people, who might have different 
perspectives.
By following all these “Why Risk 
Analysis” questions, one actually 
takes the ﬁ  rst step in this episodically 
developed trip. The result is risk 
perception.
When perceptions about 
something are not similar, serious differences of opinion appera before 
even starting the very ﬁ  rst activity 
which is to deal with Risk Analysis.
Risk perception is the subjective 
judgment that people make about the 
characteristics and severity of a risk. 
The phrase is most commonly used 
in reference to natural hazards and 
threats to the environment or health, 
such as nuclear power.
Several theories explain why 
different people make different 
estimates of the dangerousness of 
risks. Three major families of theory 
have been developed: psychological 
approaches (both heuristics and 
cognitive), anthropology/ sociological 
approaches (the cultural theory) 
and interdisciplinary approaches 
(the social ampliﬁ   cation of risk 
framework).
The study of risk perception 
originates from experts’ and laymen’ 
disagreements on deﬁ  ning  various 
risk and natural hazards.
The mid 1960s saw the rapid 
rise of nuclear technologies and the 
promise for clean and safe energy. 
However, public perception shifted 
against this new technology. Fears of 
both dangers to the environment, as 
well as immediate disasters creating 
radioactive wastelands turned the 
public against this technology. 
According to the scientiﬁ  c  and 
governmental communities, the 
problem was a difference between 
scientiﬁ   c facts and an exaggerated 
public perception of the dangers.
A key paper, written in 1969 
by Chauncey Starr revealed the 
preference approach used to ﬁ  nd out 
what risks are considered acceptable 
by society. The paper assumed that 
society had reached equilibrium 
in its judgment of risks, so the 
conclusions were that whatever risk 
levels actually existed in society, 
they were acceptable. The major 
ﬁ  nding of the paper was that people 
will accept risks 1,000 times greater 
if they are voluntary (e.g. driving a 
car) than if they are involuntary (e.g. 
a nuclear disaster). This approach 
assumed that individuals behave 
in a rational manner, and they 
weigh information before making 
a decision. People fear due to 
inadequate or incorrect information. 
Hence, additional information can 
help people understand true risk and 
lessen their perception of danger. 
Another question was whether 
additional information could also 
deepen people’s misunderstanding 
about something. While researchers 
in the engineering school did pioneer 
research in risk perception, by adapting 
theories from economics, the latter 
has little use in a practical setting. 
Numerous studies have rejected the 
belief that additional information, 
alone will shift perceptions.
The psychological approach 
focused on how people process 
information. Early works maintain 
that people use cognitive heuristics 
in sorting and simplifying 
information which leads to biases in 
comprehension. Later work built on 
this foundation became the so called 
psychometric paradigm. This type of 
approach identiﬁ  es numerous factors 
responsible for inﬂ  uencing individual 
perceptions of risk, including dread, 
newness, stigma, and other factors.
The earliest psychometric research 
was conducted by the psychologists 
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, 
who performed a series of gambling 
experiments to see how people 
evaluated probabilities. Their major 
ﬁ  nding was that people use a number 
of heuristics to evaluate information. 
These heuristics are usually useful 
shortcuts for thinking, but they may lead to inaccurate judgments in 
some situations – in which case they 
become cognitive biases.
Representativeness is usually 
employed when people are asked to 
judge the probability that an object 
or event belongs to a class/processes 
by its similarity. The results may 
be insensitivity to prior probability, 
to sample size, misconception of 
chance, insensitivity to predictability,  
illusion of validity, misconception of 
regression.
Availability refers to events that 
can be more easily brought to mind or 
imagined and hence are judged to be 
more likely than events that could not 
easily be imagined. The biases result 
due to ability to retrieve instances, 
due to the effectiveness of research 
set, due to the ability of imagination 
and illusory correlation.
Anchoring and Adjustment occur 
when people often start with one 
piece of known information and 
then adjust it to create an estimate 
of an unknown risk – but the 
adjustment will usually not be big 
enough. The results are insufﬁ  cient 
adjustment, biases in the evaluation 
of conjunctive and disjunctive event 
(conjunction fallacy), anchoring 
in the assessment of subjective 
probability distributions.
Asymmetry between gains and 
losses: people are risk averse with 
respect to gains, preferring a sure 
thing over a gamble with a higher 
expected utility but which presents 
the possibility of getting nothing. On 
the other hand, people will be risk-
seeking about losses, preferring to 
hope for the chance of losing nothing 
rather than taking a sure, but smaller, 
loss (e.g. insurance).
Threshold effects: people prefer 
to move from uncertainty to certainty 
over making a similar gain in certainty 
that does not lead to full certainty. For 
example, most people would choose 
a vaccine that reduces the incidence 
of disease A from 10% to 0% over 
one that reduces the incidence of 
disease B from 20% to 10%.
Another key ﬁ   nding was that 
experts are not necessarily any better 
at estimating probabilities than non-
expert people. Experts were often 
overconﬁ   dent in the exactness of 
their estimates, and put too much 
stock in small samples of data.
The majority of people in the 
general public express a greater 
concern for problems which appear 
to possess an immediate effect on 
everyday life such as hazardous 
waste or pesticide-use than for long-
term problems that may affect future 
generations such as climate change 
or population growth. People greatly 
rely on the scientiﬁ  c community to 
assess the threat of environmental 
problems because they usually do 
not directly experience the effects of 
phenomena such as climate change. 
The exposure most people have to 
climate change has been impersonal; 
most people only have virtual 
experience though documentaries and 
news media in what may seem like a 
“remote” area of the world. This is 
why, coupled with the population’s 
wait-and-see attitude, people do 
not understand the importance of 
changing environmentally destructive 
behaviors even when experts provide 
detailed and clear risks caused by 
climate change.
Research within the psychometric 
paradigm turned to focus on the roles 
of affect, emotion, and stigma in 
inﬂ  uencing risk perception. Melissa 
Finucane and Paul Slovic have been 
among the key researchers. These 
researchers challenged Starr’s article 
by examining expressed preference – how much risk people say they are 
willing to accept. They found that, 
contrary to Starr’s basic assumption, 
people generally saw most risks in 
society as being unacceptably high. 
They also found that the gap between 
voluntary and involuntary risks was 
not nearly as great as Starr claimed.
Slovic and team found that 
perceived risk is quantiﬁ  able  and 
predictable. People tend to view 
current risk levels as unacceptably 
high for most activities, as long as it 
is not their own decision to make. All 
things being equal, the greater people 
perceived a beneﬁ   t, the greater 
the tolerance for a risk. If a person 
derived pleasure from using a product, 
people tended to judge its beneﬁ  ts as 
high and its risks as low as the level 
of pleasure they achieved. If the 
activity was disliked, the judgments 
were opposite accordingly. Research 
in psychometrics has proven that risk 
perception is highly dependent on 
intuition, experiential thinking, and 
emotions.
Psychometric research identiﬁ  ed 
a broad domain of characteristics 
that may be condensed into three 
high order factors: 1) the degree to 
which a risk is understood, 2) the 
degree to which it evokes a feeling of 
dread, and 3) the number of people 
exposed to the respective risk. A 
dread risk elicits visceral feelings of 
terror, uncontrollable, catastrophe, 
inequality, and uncontrolled self. An 
unknown risk is new and unknown 
to science. This is why it is called 
risk, in the ﬁ  rst place. The more a 
person dreads an activity, the higher 
it’s perceived risk and the more that 
person wants the risk reduced.
As a short review of the 
second category of theories, the 
anthropology/ sociology approach 
posits risk perceptions as produced 
by and supporting social institutions. 
In this view, perceptions are socially 
constructed by institutions, cultural 
values, and ways of life. Here, the 
Cultural Theory is based on the work 
of anthropologist Mary Douglas and 
political scientist Aaron Wildavsky, 
and was ﬁ  rst published in 1982.
In Cultural Theory, Douglas and 
Wildavsky outline four “ways of life” 
in a grid/group arrangement. Each 
way of life corresponds to a speciﬁ  c 
social structure and a particular 
outlook on risk. Grid categorizes 
the degree to which people are 
constrained and circumscribed in 
their social role. The tighter binding 
of social constraints limits individual 
negotiation capabilities. Group refers 
to the extent to which individuals are 
bounded by feelings of belonging or 
solidarity. The greater the bonds, the 
less individual choice are subject to 
personal control. Four ways of life 
include: Hierarchical, Individualist, 
Egalitarian, and Fatalist.
Risk perception researchers have 
not widely accepted Cultural theory. 
Even Douglas says that the theory is 
controversial and poses the danger of 
moving out of the favored paradigm 
of individual rational choice of which 
many researchers are comfortable.
The third branch group of theories 
deals with the Interdisciplinary 
approach, main surfacing concept 
here being Social ampliﬁ  cation  of 
risk framework.
The Social Ampliﬁ  cation  of 
Risk Framework (SARF), combines 
research in psychology, sociology, 
anthropology, and communications 
theory. SARF outlines how 
communications of risk events pass 
from the sender through intermediate 
stations to a receiver and in the 
process serve to amplify or attenuate 
perceptions of risk. All links in the Sustainability. 3rd ed. New York: Psychology, 
2010.
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communication chain, individuals, 
groups, media, etc., contain ﬁ  lters 
through which information is sorted 
and understood.
The SAR framework attempts to 
explain the process by which risks 
are ampliﬁ  ed, receiving more public 
attention, or attenuated, receiving 
less public attention. The framework 
may be used to compare responses 
from different groups in a single 
event, or analyze the same risk issue 
in multiple events. In a single risk 
event, some groups may amplify their 
perception of risks while other groups 
may attenuate, or decrease, their 
perceptions of risk. The main thesis of 
SARF states that risk events interact 
with individual psychological, social 
and other cultural factors in ways that 
either increase or decrease public 
perceptions of risk. Behaviors of 
individuals and groups then generate 
secondary social or economic impacts 
while also increasing or decreasing 
the physical risk itself. 
These ripple effects caused by 
the ampliﬁ   cation of risk include 
enduring mental perceptions, impacts 
on business sales, and change in 
residential property values, changes 
in training and education, or social 
disorder. These secondary changes 
are perceived and reacted to by 
individuals and groups resulting in 
third-order impacts. As each higher-
order impacts are reacted to, they may 
ripple to other parties and locations. 
Traditional risk analyses neglect these 
ripple effect impacts and thus greatly 
underestimate the adverse effects 
from certain risk events. Public 
distortion of risk signals provides 
a corrective mechanism by which 
society assesses a fuller determination 
of the risk and its impacts to such 
things not traditionally factored into 
a risk analysis.
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